A new defense agreement with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, alongside an initiative to grow closer to the China-Russia-centered Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), even while remaining in a Western military alliance — is Erdogan repositioning Turkey at the center of a new geopolitical balance? An important shift has become clear in Turkey’s foreign policy in recent years. Multi-vector diplomacy has increasingly become a defining feature of Turkish foreign policy.
On one hand, the country remains part of the Western security structure as an important NATO member; on the other, it is deepening ties with China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Central Asian countries. As a result, viewing Ankara’s diplomacy simply as part of a Western bloc no longer captures the full picture. Rather, Turkey is trying to expand its strategic space by maintaining relationships with multiple power centers simultaneously.
The most recent example of this is the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement. On Aug. 7, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan signed this agreement in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. The core idea of the agreement is that an armed attack on any one of the three countries will be considered an attack on all three. On Aug. 31 in Istanbul, officials from the three countries discussed advancing the work of the strategic political and defense committee formed under the agreement, and the formal use of the name “Mecca Defense Alliance” for the pact came to the fore.
Many are calling this agreement an “Islamic NATO.” But while the comparison is politically appealing, the Mecca pact is not yet, structurally speaking, a military alliance equivalent to NATO. Important questions remain unresolved: how the mutual defense commitments would actually be implemented, under what circumstances military assistance would be provided, and how a joint command or military capability would be run.
Still, there is no denying the agreement’s strategic significance. Saudi Arabia has vast economic and energy resources, Turkey has a strong defense industry and military capability, and Pakistan has a large military and nuclear capability. As a result, there is potential for the three countries’ capabilities to complement each other. Instability in the Middle East’s security situation and a growing tendency among Gulf countries to reconsider their reliance on U.S. security guarantees have also created an important backdrop for this agreement.
Interestingly, Ankara has rejected claims that this new defense framework is pulling Turkey away from NATO. Turkey’s communications directorate has made clear that the Mecca pact is not an alternative to NATO, but rather a complementary regional security-cooperation arrangement. In Turkey’s words, building regional partnerships doesn’t mean stepping away from NATO membership.
This captures the core feature of Turkey’s current foreign policy. Ankara doesn’t want to become fully dependent on any single power center. While NATO remains an important military and security foundation for it, Turkey is simultaneously expanding ties with the Middle East, Central Asia and Asia’s major powers. This policy can be described as “multi-vector diplomacy” or “strategic balancing.”
Turkey’s relationship with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation is another important dimension of this shift. Turkey is currently not a full SCO member; its status is that of a dialogue partner. But returning from an SCO summit in early September, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said Turkey could consider becoming a full member of the organization. He also stressed that closer ties with Eastern powers do not mean turning away from the Western alliance.
The significance of the SCO lies in the fact that China and Russia are among its central powers. India, Iran and several Central Asian countries are also part of it. So if Turkey moves toward full membership in the future, it wouldn’t just be joining an international organization — it would allow Ankara to further institutionalize its relationships with both Western and non-Western security and economic structures simultaneously.
But this policy carries risks too. As a NATO member, Turkey has certain obligations under the Western security structure. On the other hand, deeper ties with the SCO could increase Ankara’s strategic cooperation with China and Russia. Balancing between two different geopolitical systems could grow increasingly complex for Turkey.
In the Erdogan government’s view, though, this duality may be more of an opportunity than a problem. Turkey’s geographic position gives it direct connections to Europe, the Middle East, the Black Sea, the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Mediterranean. Using this geography, Ankara wants to establish itself not just as a regional power, but as a bridge for communication between different power centers.
The Mecca pact is the Middle East-focused expression of that policy. The push to expand ties with the SCO is its Asia-focused expression. And NATO membership is its guarantee of maintaining a connection to the Western security structure. Looking at all three together, Turkey’s strategy becomes clearer — rather than choosing a single bloc, it is trying to increase its influence and bargaining power across multiple frameworks at once.
If this policy succeeds, Turkey could build a stronger position as an important “middle power” in the future multipolar world order. If tensions rise between the West and the East, Ankara would benefit from being able to maintain contact with both sides. Across the Middle East crisis, the Russia-Ukraine war, Black Sea security, or Asia’s new economic corridors, Turkey could increase its role as a mediator or important partner in various areas.
But maintaining balance is the biggest test for multi-vector diplomacy to succeed. Deepening ties with NATO, the SCO, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Russia and China simultaneously means retaining the ability to make independent decisions even amid conflicting interests. Excessive closeness with one side could damage trust with another.
So it’s possible to view Turkey’s moves toward the Mecca pact or the SCO not as preparation to leave NATO, but as part of a larger strategy. Ankara may have realized that the future world will no longer be led by a single power. As competition intensifies among China, Russia, the United States, Europe, India and regional powers, the value of maintaining ties with multiple power centers will only grow.
For Turkey, then, the question isn’t confined to a simple “West or East” dichotomy. Rather, the question is how independent a strategic position it can build while simultaneously maintaining ties with the Western security alliance, regional cooperation within the Muslim world, and Asia’s emerging multilateral frameworks.
The Mecca pact, the SCO and NATO, then, are not three separate chapters of Turkish foreign policy. Rather, they are three facets of a single multidimensional strategy, aimed at establishing Turkey as an important geopolitical center in its own right, rather than a follower of any single power bloc. How successful this strategy proves over the coming years could influence not just Turkey’s position, but the broader balance of power across the Middle East and Eurasia.