Recent defense cooperation between Greece and Israel has added a new dimension to eastern Mediterranean geopolitics. On Aug. 31, the two countries signed a defense agreement worth about 3 billion euros, under which Israel will build an integrated air-defense system for Greece. The project, known as “Achilles’ Shield,” is set to incorporate David’s Sling, Barak MX, SPYDER and various multi-role radar technologies. The agreement has been described as the largest defense deal in the two countries’ history.
Writer Murat Aslan does not view the agreement as a simple arms purchase. In his view, it could gradually make Greece’s security structure dependent on Israeli technology and strategic cooperation. He even analyzes the name “Achilles’ Shield” symbolically. Against the Greek mythological hero Achilles, he points to the Hebrew word “ayil,” meaning the ram substituted as a sacrifice in the story of Abraham. His argument is that “Achilles,” used as a symbol of Greece’s strategic self-reliance, risks ultimately becoming the “ayil” used to serve someone else’s geopolitical interests.
Still, there is no denying the agreement’s military significance. Israel will help Greece build a multi-layered air and missile defense structure that includes David’s Sling, Barak MX, SPYDER and MMR radar. As part of Greece’s broader “Achilles’ Shield” program, the country plans to spend considerably more on defense in the coming years. This is also tied to plans to acquire F-35 fighter jets from the United States and other military equipment from European countries.
From Athens’ perspective, the main driver behind this is Turkey. Greece and Turkey have long-standing disputes over maritime boundaries in the Aegean Sea and eastern Mediterranean, the militarization of islands, the continental shelf, energy resources and Cyprus. Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis has recently reiterated a firm stance on the right to extend territorial waters to 12 nautical miles in the Aegean. He has said Greece needs no one’s permission for how it arms itself.
Turkey’s position, on the other hand, is entirely opposite. Ankara opposes the militarization of the eastern Aegean islands and has repeatedly called on Greece to abide by its obligations under the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne and the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan recently warned that Turkey does not seek to seize other countries’ territory, but will not accept violations of its own rights either.
In this environment, the big question is what impact Greece-Israel defense cooperation will have on the regional balance of power. From Israel’s perspective, Turkey is increasingly becoming an important strategic rival. It has been argued that, with Iran’s influence in Syria declining, Russia’s regional role shifting, and Turkey’s military and diplomatic influence growing, Israel is seeking to create a new strategic equation in the eastern Mediterranean.
Military, energy and security cooperation among Greece, Israel and the Greek Cypriot administration has also grown over the past decade. As a result, a trend toward building a trilateral security structure in the eastern Mediterranean is visible. This has been joined by cooperation on cybersecurity, counter-drone measures, air defense and military technology. Turkey, meanwhile, is also building new security partnerships with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, including the “Mecca Joint Defense Agreement.” As a result, the security equations of the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East are increasingly becoming interconnected.
But increased military capability does not necessarily mean guaranteed security. If Greece makes a large part of its air defense, radar and military command structure dependent on foreign technology, that could create strategic dependence during a crisis over the control, maintenance and software management of that technology. At the same time, there is concern that if Greece, in building deterrence against Turkey, becomes part of a regional conflict framework over which Athens does not have full control, its defense capability could increase even as its strategic independence declines.
Greece’s own position, however, is quite different. Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis has said strategic defense cooperation with Israel will continue. At the same time, he wants to expand ties with Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries. In other words, Athens’ goal is not simply to build an Israel-centered alliance, but, based on the Greek government’s statements, to strengthen its own security and diplomatic position by maintaining relationships with multiple partners across the eastern Mediterranean and Middle East.
And here is where another meaning of the name “Achilles” comes into play. Boosting defense capability is undoubtedly important for Greece. But if a state’s security becomes increasingly dependent on another state’s weapons, technology and strategic support, the cost of that security must also be weighed. A military alliance can, on one hand, increase deterrent capability, while on the other hand it can also heighten a rival state’s security concerns. This can create a cycle of arms competition and counter-alliances.
Both Greece and Turkey are NATO members. As a result, a military conflict between the two countries would not remain a purely bilateral crisis; it would put pressure on NATO, the European Union and the United States as well. During the 1996 Imia crisis too, the United States had to intervene directly to bring the situation under control. So if the current tensions spiral out of control, their impact could spread beyond the eastern Mediterranean.
The most important point is that a political solution to the Greece-Turkey dispute still remains beyond the reach of military capability. Disagreements over maritime boundaries in the Aegean and eastern Mediterranean, Cyprus, and the militarization of islands cannot be resolved simply with new missiles or radars. Alongside military balance, direct dialogue, confidence-building measures and a binding dispute-resolution framework are needed.
So “Achilles’ Shield” can undoubtedly strengthen Greece’s defense capability. But this system will simultaneously deepen the Greece-Israel strategic relationship and could intensify security competition with Turkey. In the end, the real question facing Greece may be this: build an ever-stronger arsenal, or build a regional security framework in which Turkey and Greece can manage their disputes politically, rather than seeing each other as permanent enemies. Because weapons can build deterrence, but they cannot resolve political disputes.