Professor Ferdous Arfina Osman of the University of Dhaka spoke to BD Global Times about local government reform.
Question 1. You served on the Local Government Reform Commission, which submitted its final report in April 2025. Looking back, which of its recommendations matter most now, and which do you think have been taken up?
Answer: In Bangladesh’s history, the Local Government Reform Commission 2025 was the eighth national-level Commission established to recommend reform in the local government. The Commission was mandated to suggest practical measures to transform the local government of Bangladesh into a strong, autonomous and inclusive institution.
Drawing on various research findings, recommendations of the previously formed commission, stakeholder consultations across 7 divisions and a survey on 46080 people from 64 districts, the Commission offered 51 key recommendations to reform local government. To date, the current government has accepted only one of these recommendations.
One of the key recommendations of the Local Government Reform Commission (2025) was to restore non-partisan local government elections, as had been a practice prior to 2015. The Awami League government introduced party-based local elections in 2015 through amending the relevant local government laws, allowing candidates to contest under party symbols. This provision contributed to making the local elections extremely violent, weakened representation of local communities, destroyed the social fabrics, and a corresponding decline in the effectiveness of local governance. In a welcome development, on 9 April 2026, the current Parliament removed the provision for holding local government elections under party symbols from the existing law. This decision is expected to create a more conducive environment for peaceful and competitive local elections.
However, a wide range of recommendations of the Commission are still left unimplemented. In particular, the recommendations related to three broad areas should be executed as a matter of urgency in order to strengthen local government and enhance its effectiveness. They include:
Structural reform:
The current local government system is fragmented, structurally inconsistent and poorly coordinated. It is composed of five tiers of local government institutions across urban and rural levels. Rural local government has three institutions at three tiers: Zilla Parishad at the district level, Upazila Parishad at the Upazila Level and Union Parishad at the union level. Urban areas, on the other hand, have two local bodies: City Corporations in big cities and municipalities in small towns.
At the rural level, direct elections are held only for the Union Parishads while Upazila Parishad follows a partially direct system –only the Chairman and Vice Chairmen are directly elected by the local people while the elected Union Parishad Chairmen within the Upazila serve as the members of the Parishad without having direct mandate over its governance. Zilla Parishad is formed through an indirect electoral process. The elected Upazila Parishad Chairmen within the district act as its constituent members, yet they do not possess a direct representative mandate over the Zila Parishad. This arrangement creates structural and accountability gaps, which hinders the effective functioning of the Zila Parishad. On the other hand, at the urban level, both City Corporation and municipalities are democratically elected bodies.
The Commission suggests that all five LG institutions (Zila Parishad, Upazila Parishad, Union Parishad, Pourasava and City Corporation) should have a uniformly designed structure with a specific focus on having a rational ward system and democratic election at each level so that all can function in a uniform manner.
In addition to this, the Commission suggested that all five LGIs in both rural and urban level should adopt a uniform organizational structure for their efficient functioning. Drawing on Parliamentary system of government at the national level, the Commission proposed that each local government institution comprise two distinct bodies: legislative body and executive body. The legislative body would consist of all the elected members including the Chairmen (head of local bodies in rural areas)/Mayor (head of local bodies in urban areas), Standing Committee members. On the other hand, the executive body would comprise the Chairman and an Executive Council of 5-6 full time members who will be responsible for the day-to-day administration of the local government institution. The elected members would elect the Chairman and the members of the Executive Council from among the elected members. A similar constitutional framework for rural and urban local governance was introduced in India through the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments in 1992, which came into effect in 1993.
This arrangement would help curb the concentration of power in the hands of the Chairman/Mayor in the local government institutions enabling the elected members to exercise authority. It would also promote power sharing, strengthen democratic practice and enhance accountability in local governance.
Electoral reform:
One vital reform that Bangladesh’s local government needs urgently is its electoral reform, which is closely related to the structural reform mentioned earlier. Local government elections are held at different levels at different times under different laws and systems. To make LGIs truly democratic institutions, at first, each tier should have a rational number of wards depending on the size of population.
Currently, Union Parishads in Bangladesh vary significantly in terms of both area and population. Some unions are large, while others are relatively small, with areas ranging from around 12 sq km to as much as 1,500 sq km, for example, all UPs have 9 wards but population of Unions varies from 4,000 to 400,000. Despite these wide disparities, all Union Parishads are divided into nine wards, resulting in an uneven and often inefficient distribution of resources. The Commission proposed that unions may have 9-39 wards each comprising 1,200-1,500 population.
On the other hand, Upazila and Zila Parishads do not have any ward. Like UP, both the Upazila and Zila Parishads could be reorganized into clearly defined electoral Wards. For example, each Union Parishad could be treated as comprising three wards within an Upazila Parishad; thus, an Upazila with five unions would have a total of fifteen electoral Wards. Similarly, each Upazila could be considered as forming three to five constituent wards within a Zila Parishad. These Wards would be created solely for electoral purposes, aimed at strengthening representation and improving institutional accountability.
In line with the parliamentary system of government practiced at the national level, the Commission proposed abolishing the provision for the direct election of Chairmen (leaders of rural local bodies)/Mayors (leaders of urban local bodies). Instead, members (rural local bodies) /councilors (urban local bodies) would be directly elected by the people and would subsequently elect the Chairmen /Mayors from among themselves. The Commission observed that under the current system, power is excessively concentrated in the hands of the Chairman/Mayor, reducing local government institutions to a “one-man show.” In some cases, elected members are left with little or no meaningful role in decision-making. To address this power imbalance, the Commission recommended this arrangement through which it is expected that a balanced distribution of authority will be ensured and democratic practices within local government institutions would be strengthened.
Legal reform:
Currently, local government runs through five different laws and hundreds of rules since five local bodies were not formed at the same time. Along with that there exist a large number of circulars and gazettes issued over time. This proliferation of laws/rules create confusions, duplications in the functioning of local government leading to delay in decision making, lack of coordination among the local bodies and most importantly, compromised service delivery at the local level. Furthermore, the existing provision of issuing gazettes and circulars through executive orders from time to time creates the opportunities for political interferences and abuse of power.
Following the recommendation of the Shawqat Ali Commission 2008, the LG Reform Commission 2025 also recommends for having an umbrella law in order to operate the local bodies in an efficient way. The Commission has suggested two separate umbrella laws for rural and urban local bodies.
Question 2. Since August 2024, city corporations, district councils, upazila parishads and municipalities have largely been run by appointed administrators rather than elected representatives. What has that meant for services and accountability?
Answer: When administrators take over the management of local bodies they effectively become the “local authorities”, that may be less capable of delivering services in the same way as local government institutions do. Following the July revolution in 2024, many elected local government leaders have fled away leaving their positions vacant. The interim government appointed administrators to those local government bodies in order to ensure continuity of functioning of them.
The appointed administrators in local bodies generally perform mere routine functions and provide services with limited responsiveness to the local needs. On the other hand, the elected functionaries are accountable to the local residents through the electoral process and thereby they have stronger incentive for providing services effectively. Furthermore, community people tend to feel themselves closer to the elected functionaries than to the administrators. This two-way relationship strengthens responsiveness and accountability in service delivery. Local bodies lack this when they are headed by the administrators.
Question 3. The Election Commission has set aside its plan to start union parishad elections in November and now aims to hold them in the first half of next year, finishing before 6 June. What would make local elections credible, and should they be held with or without party symbols?
Answer: Yes, the union parishad (UP) election is going to be held between 21 January and May, 2027 and we are hopeful that they will be credible.
The Election Commission has expressed its commitment to hold free, fair and credible local elections as they did during the 13th Parliamentary election held in February, this year. Moreover, the government’s recent decision of holding local elections without party symbol, in line with the recommendation of the LG Commission 2025, would help reduce electoral violence and also promote inclusiveness. Furthermore, government may consider about forming election tribunal at the local level so that prompt actions can be taken against those who would violate electoral code of conducts.
Question 4. The commission recommended that chairs and mayors be chosen from among elected members rather than directly. What would that change for voters and for councils?
Answer: As mentioned before, under the current system, local government institutions are largely dominated by a single individual, with the Chairman/Mayor exercising disproportionate decision-making power leaving other elected members with little meaningful role. If elections were held only for the positions of members/councillors, who would subsequently elect the Chairman/Mayor from among themselves, it would empower the members and make the Chairmen/Mayors reliant on their support. Such interdependence could help curb the excessive concentration of power in the hands of a single individual and strengthen democratic values and practices within local government institutions, which would subsequently contribute to making service delivery efficient and accountable.
Question 5. Councils depend heavily on grants from the centre. What would real decentralisation need, in money and in authority?
Answer: Local government should have a decentralized development plan and balanced transfer of power between the central and local government to ensure fiscal and administrative decentralization.
Currently, local government institutions (LGIs) are heavily dependent on central government. With the exception of municipalities and city corporations all LGIs rely on central government for paying the salaries of their own staff. To implement the development projects under the Annual Development Plan (ADP), separate fiscal transfers/grants are issued for different tiers. Development partners also implement various types of vertical projects often with less coordination among themselves and local bodies. Consequently, local bodies enjoy very little or no autonomy to manage their own budget and formulating and implementing development plans according to the local priorities.
To promote fiscal decentralization, the 2025 Commission proposed to formulate a comprehensive decentralized “District Plan” consolidating the development plans of the district and its constituent local government institutions including upazila and union parishad, pourasava/city corporations. Development projects undertaken by the NGOs / development partners should also be incorporated into the plan. Districts should be given the authority to distribute the funds allocated for it and determine the expenditure priorities according to the local needs. This approach would enhance local fiscal autonomy, improve coordination among development initiatives and ensure that public resources are directed toward locally identified priorities.
The Constitution of Bangladesh has mandated the government for ensure administrative decentralization. According to the Article 59 of the Constitution, every administrative unit has a local government body elected by the local people. Alongside the local bodies, central government ministries maintain their local level offices assigned with similar overlapping functions causing duplication of efforts and wastage of resources. Government has already transferred 9 departments to the union level and 16 departments to the Upazila level. However, these transfers have yet to be fully functionalized, as the corresponding funds, functionaries and finance of these departments have not been transferred to the respective LGIs.
To make administrative decentralization efficient and effective, along with the functions, funds and functionaries of the government departments at the local level should also be transferred to the respective LGIs. This would enable local government institutions to exercise their assigned responsibilities effectively, reduce administrative duplication, and improve coordination and service delivery.
Question 6. Should members of parliament have any formal role in local councils, or should the two be kept apart?
Answer: Geographically, although the Members of Parliament (MPs) and Upazila Chairmen share the same constituency, MPs should not have any formal role in local government bodies for three main reasons:
First, MPs are legislators who are responsible for framing laws and representing the people in the Parliament. Their primary focus should, therefore, be to articulate peoples’ concerns and ensuring that their voices are heard at the national policy level.
Second, local government institutions (LGIs) are the parts of the executive branch of the Government. Allowing MPs, the legislators, to exercise any formal authority in these institutions could undermine the principle of separation of power.
Third, MPs should be kept apart from the LGIs to prevent their national level political influence from overshadowing the authority of Upazila Chairmen, who are elected to lead local government at the upazila level (i.e. Upazila Parishad). Otherwise, MPs would dominate the local decision-making undermining the autonomy and significance of Upazila Parishad.
Question 7. Women hold reserved seats on local councils. Do those seats carry real power, and what would change that?
Answer: One third of the seats at the local level have been kept reserved for women. But in practice, this provision has not produced the desired results. The Union Parishad Act 1997 introduced the provision of direct election to three reserved seats for women at the Union Parishad (UP) level. Under this arrangement, each elected female member represents three wards, each of which is also represented by an elected male member. This arrangement often conflicts and overlaps with the jurisdiction of male and female members where the male members often play the decisive role. Thus, the current system has been failing to ensure women participation in local level decision making.
To make women participation more effective, 30 percent of wards across all local government institutions be reserved for women, to be filled through a rotational system over consecutive election cycle. For example, under the current Union Parishad structure, all nine wards would have female representation ensured over three successive elections. In the first election, women will directly compete for 3 wards, in the next election after five years women will compete for next 3 wards and it will continue in the next election.
Question 8. To close: what single reform would most improve how the state reaches people in districts and villages?
Answer: It is difficult to identify a single reform that can bring state close to the grassroots people. However, broadly speaking, this requires improved public service delivery through an effective decentralization policy that ensures both administrative and fiscal decentralization. Local bodies should enjoy autonomy in making their development plans and decide the expenditure priorities in line with the local needs. Local level development plans should be formulated locally-at the district level. For that, the concept of district planning as recommended by the Commission needs to be given priority.
বাংলায় মূল প্রতিবেদন পড়ুন · Read the original Bengali report